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INTRODUCTION 
"Privatization" is being promoted in this decade as the ultimate economic pan-
acea. The latest "privatization craze" began in 1980 in Britain under Margaret 
Thatcher and has since spread throughout the industrialized nations of the world, 
such as France, Japan, the United States.] More recently, the policy of privatiza-
tion has been introduced in Mexico, Brazil, and other Third World countries.:! 
Billions of dollars of public assets have already been sold on the market to private 
investors and billions more of government tax revenues have been contracted out 
to private firms during this decade, 
What precisely is this latest economic phenomenon sweeping through the 
economies of the nonsocialist world? Why are privatization programs instituted? 
What are their motivations and objectives? What do they accomplish? These are 
some of the more important questions raised by the privatization phenomenon, 
and the answers are being provided by many scholars, One thing is certain, 
however: the debate is far from over, and definitive, objective. and conclusive 
answers to these questions have yet to be provided to a largely uninformed public, 
Although the geographical focus of this discussion is Latin America. it begins 
with a consideration of privatization in the center. or industrialized, nations of the 
world: it is here where the philosophy. policy, and programs of privatization 
originated and from where they are being imposed upon the dependent. peripheral 
countries of the third world,:! It then takes up Latin America's privatization 
programs, particularly those in Brazil and Mexico. Combined, this approach 
provides a holistic view of contemporary privatization from a number of different 
perspectives, 
DEFINITIONS AND TYPES 
Over time, privatization has meant different things to different people in different 
countries. Privatization has been part of many other programs: liberalization, 
export promotion, and industrial transformation. It has, consequently. numerous 
pseudonyms and many forms, Nevertheless, most privatization programs can be 
categorized in the following general types: 
l. Denationalization-the transfer of public property and enterprises to private 
investors: 
2. Franchising-the contracting out to private firms of public services financed by 
taxes; and 
3. Deregulation-the liberalization of private enterprise operations from public 
controL 4 
Before 1987, "privatization" was not listed in Webster's dictionary. In 1987, 
however, Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary records: "primtize; to make 
private; esp. to change (as a business or industry) from public to private contract 
or ownership---privatization." 
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PRIVATIZATION IN THE CENTER 
BRIEF HISTORY 
Privatization, whi7h has a very long history in Europe and the West, is simply the 
tran~feral of p~bhc assets and activities to private ownership_ History. therefore, 
pr~)vI~es .us with a ~ackground useful for an understanding of contemporary 
pnvatlzatlOn. The entire transition from feudalism to capitalism can be interpreted 
as a process of privatization. as can the enclosure movement, the seizure of 
Catholic Church properties, and the freeing of the serfs, as well as the later 
conquest and colonization of Asia, Africa. and America by the Europeans.5 Most 
of the property privatized during this period, from 1500 to 1700, was first con-
fiscated by the state and then transferred to private and corporate entities. The 
result was a massive transfer of wealth and power to the European monopolistic 
merchants and corporations. 
I.nitially,. and for a period of time during the latter half of the eighteenth century, 
the mdustrlal revolutIOn and representative democracies retarded this earlier drive 
t? centralized priv~tization. Industrial competition replaced mercantile monopo-
!~es, and the emergIng democracies of the Americas and Europe were ostensibly 
oft.he people, by the people, and for the people." Privatization in this century was 
contmued at a slower pace and was often accompanied by a modest amount of 
financial compensation. 
Lib.eral policies of la!ssez.-faire and free trade in the late 1800s and early 1900s 
~av~ nse to the next hlstonc stage of centralized privatization. Industrial cap-
Itahsm matured, merged, and emerged as monopoly capitalism./) A new wave of 
colonization in Asia and Africa compensated the Europeans, in part, for the loss of 
their American c?lonies and property. This time around, the newly emerging 
p<?wers ~f the U ~Ited States and Japan participated. This latest stage of imperi-
ali.sm,. VI~ coloOles as well as free trade and international finance, expanded 
privatizatIOn throughout the globe-leaving no region untouched.7 
World War I, the socialist revolution in Russia, the Great Depression of the 
19?Os,. an.d World War II combined to reverse this century's trend to global 
privatizatIOn-at least temporarily. The post-World War II wave of socialism and 
the nati~:malization. of private property in both the center nations of Europe and in 
the penpheral natIOns of Asia, Africa, and Latin America might even be called 
"deprivatization." At the very least, these new socialist economies, as well as 
nationalized enterprises and public properties everywhere, henceforth constituted 
formidable barriers to any future expansion of capitalism. 
Nevertheless,. monopoly capitalism not only survived but prospered in the 
second half of thiS century. Multinational corporations, their home governments 
and international institutions-such as the World Bank OBRD) and the Interna~ 
tional ~onetary Fund (1M F)-have greatly extended privatization throughout the 
world smce World War ILx Monopoly capitalism has, however, by the decade of 
t~e 1980s, reached the national frontiers of the socialist world, and further expan-
sion has been blocked in this direction as well as by the internal barriers of public 
property and nationalized enterprises. Frustrated by attempts to roll back the 
natIOnal frontiers of socialism in such countries as Cuba, Vietnam and Korea 
int~rn~tional. c~pital shif~ed. t~ a policy of removing the internal ba~riers to pri~ 
va~lza~lOn. wlthm the capltahstlc center and the peripheral nations. Contemporary 
pnvatlz~tl~n, t~erefore, c~n be viewed as the latest expansionist phase of monop-
~ly capitalism ~n the makmg of a global economy dominated by private transna-
tIonal corporatlOns.9 
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CONTEMPORARY PRIVATIZATION-INDUSTRIAL NATIONS 
While since 1980 virtually ev~ry mdustfl.ahz.ed ~ountry-mcludmg ~rance, West 
Germany, and Italy-has instituted a pnvatlzatlOn program, the major ones ~re 
those in Great Britain, the United St~tes.' and Japan. One. of the mo~t peculiar 
features of privatization in these count:les IS t~e lack. o~ offiCial explanatIOns by the 
roments responsible for them. Neither Pnme MIOIstcr Thatcher nor PreSident gove I fh' ,,' Reagan publicly explained the reasons for or the goa s.o t elr pnvatlzatI?n 
ro rams; they simply implemented the programs ~~d left It to ot~ers to .explaIn, ~ati~nalize, or justify. Ri~ht-wing "think ~anks," political analysts, Journahsts, and 
social scientists were qUick to fill the vOldY) . 
From the public documents and utterances of s~ch bodies, we .are. able to 
surmise the following objectives: (1) to expand the private sector (capitalism) an~ 
shrink the public sector and government; (2) to help financ.e government expendi-
tures in the short run; (3) t~ incre~s.e the n~mber of pnvate shareholders and 
od the base of conservative pohtlcal parties; and (4) to reduce the power of expa ...' I' d . trade unions and shrink the poiItlcal base ot labor: SOCia ~SL an pro~resslve 
parties. I I All of these goals are political and. ideologlc.a!. . It I.S wort~ notmg t~~t 
where does one encounter reference to eqUity or SOCial JustIce as eIther exphclt ~~ implicit objectives, while efficiency, growth, and stability are, for the most part, 
merely implied goals. , . . 
It is perhaps not surprising that Great Bntam I: bot~ th.e c?untry where 
contemporary privatization began and the ~odel lor Yrlvat.lzatton programs 
throughout the world. Since 1979, 16 large p~bhc enter~n~es Wlt~ a market v.alue 
of approximately $18 billion have been sold In Great Br .. taI~. at.dls~ounted pnces. 
Yet another $10 billion of public assets were ~Iated .for pnvatl~~tJo~ ,In 1988. Am?ng 
the public firms already priv~tize? ~re ~ritlsh .Alrways,. ~ntlsh IelecommunJca-
tions, and British Gas. Pubhc utJht~es, Includ.Ing elect:lclty. an? wate.r, are .al:o 
scheduled for privatization. Along WIth promotIng denatIOnalizatIOn, Pnme M.lnls-
ter Thatcher and her government have reduced taxes an~ deregula~ed pnvate 
enterprise. Thatcher's recent re-election to a third succes.sl"ve ter~ v.lrtually as~ 
sures that every British public enterprise, of any value, Will be pnvatIzed before 
she leaves office. . .. 
The London International Stock Exchange was deregulated.In 1987 to faclitate 
the financing of this privatization program. This industry, WhiC? acco~n~s f~r 5 
percent of the nation's jobs, was privatization's answer to deIndustnalizatlOn. 
Unfortunately for the program, however, the October 1987 stock mar~et crash 
lowered the value of everyone's newly acquired shares and caused wldespr~a,d 
unemployment and bankruptcies.l~ The market has since. recovered, and Bntam s 
privatization program is once again b~ck. on c~~rse. While sp.ecula~ors benefited 
from the privatization program, finanCial Instability was the price p~ld .. 
Competition was obviously not enhanced, since many of the pnva~lzed cnter-
prises, including British Telecom and British Petroleum, ~resently enJoy. monop-
oly or semi~monopoly status. In essence, deregulated private monopoites were 
merely created from regulated public monopolies. ~~cause the shares were sold ~t 
discounts ranging from 6 percent in the case of Bntlsh Petrol~um to 91 p~rcent. I~ 
the case of British Telecom,I.' immediate windfall profits and Insta?t capital ,gains 
were realized by the private investors. Ironical~y, a~ ~amLl,el Bntton, .asslstant 
editor of the Financial Times, points ouL the natlOnahzIng ot many public corpo-
rations such as British Leyland and Rolls~Royce, "were not planned acts of 
nation~lization but rescue operations for ailing companies." 14 O~ce saved from 
bankruptcy and made solvent by the government, these enterpnses were later 
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privatized in the 1,980s. The booming stock prices in the financial markets and 
depressed wage~ In the la,?or markets virtually guaranteed profits to the new 
pr~vat~ m~:mopohes and their shareholders-not all of whom are British citizens. 
~nvatlzatIon .also benefited the Conservative Party government, which balanced 
Its budget with the procee~s from these public sales. Everybody else, one as-
sumes: was a. loser wh? paid the cost of privatization. In this manner did all the 
pe?p~e s pubhc enterpn~e ~eco.me only some of the people's private property in 
Bnt~~n. ~dvo~ates.of pnv~tlzatlOn everywhere have conveniently ignored the fact 
that natIOnalized mdustnes are supposed to belong to the public already and that 
the qovern.m~nl holds them merely as a trustee on the public's behalf. "15 
LIke Bnta~n. the United States embarked upon a privatization program soon 
~fter the ~lectlOn of Ronald Reagan and the Republican Party in 1980. Privatization 
In .the United States, how.ever,.differs from that of Britain for the simple reason that 
thIS country has few na~lOnahzed enterprises. In addition, approximately 25 per-
cent of ~he ~.S. populatIOn are a!ready shareholders, and individual ownership of 
ho.uses IS wlde~pread. In the UOIted States, even the so-called public utilities are 
pnvate ~nterpn:es. The U.S. central bank, the Federal Reserve Board, is also a 
~omposlte of pnvately owned regional banks. Moreover, government procurement 
IS, for the most part, contracted out to private firms in road construction defense 
and educati~n. Public servic~s, too, such as garbage collection, retirem~nt plans: 
health benefits, and food rehef, have been traditionally allocated by contracting 
out and vouchers. 
There~ore, the U.S. privatization program was characterized by tax reductions, 
deregulatIOn, mergers, and above all. public debt. Recent tax reductions accom-
pa.nie~ b~ incre~sed de.ficit go~ernment spending constitute the largest single 
pnvatlzatlOn act III the hIstory ot the world. Since 1980 the Reagan administration 
doubled the U. S. ~ederal government debt from $1.2 trillion to $2.4 trillion, and in 
the process transformed the U niled States from an international creditor to a 
debtor n.ation. Presently, the country owes foreigners a net $400 billion. With 
record .hl~h budget and tr~d.e deficits of over $150 billion each, the U.S. foreign 
debt v.:tI~ mcrease to $1 tnlhon by 1990. Corporate mergers, totaling more than 
$600 billion b~tween 1980 and 1987, were made possible by these tax reductions. 
Today,.the. UOIted States has .bec:ome a tax haven with virtually no corporate taxes 
and. with ,mcome tax rates slgOlficantly lower than those in the other developed 
~atlOns ot th~ center. If> In this way, public tax obligations were converted to private 
mv~stments III b~nd~, st?cks, and futures; that is. privatized. Like the British, the 
U OIted . States pnvatlzatlon program fueled financial· speculation, industrial con-
centratlo~, and financi~1 inst~bility. Unlike the British, the U.S. privatization 
pr?gram Illcreased public deficits and debts, since fewer public assets were sold in 
thiS country and the tax reductions were larger. 
In ~he n:tid-~980s, however, the Reagan administration embarked upon a modest 
denatIOnalizatIOn program, selling public assets in an attempt to reduce the federal 
government budget deficit in accordance with the Gramm-Rudman guidelines.J7 
Federal lo~ns o~ farms, homes, and other subsidized properties were offered for 
sale to pnvate mvestors at discounts of up to 42 percent.H~ Consolidated Rail 
Corporation (Conrail), a public enterprise created in 1976 from the remains of six 
bankrupt northeastern railroads, was recently sold for a reputed $1.6 billion to 
~o:rol~ Souther? Corporation. ~ince 1976, U.S. taxpayers have pumped $7.7 
bl!h?n ~nto the hne and turned It around to a profitable concern earning $442 
mllhon III 1986. 19 
Not ev~n defense or foreign policy were spared privatization in the United 
States durmg the Reagan administration. Of the $6.8 billion in Strategic Defense 
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Initiative ("Star Wars") contract~ award~~ over four years, $4.4. billion in cont.ra.cts 
was awarded to the 20 larg~st pnvate mIlitary c~mtractors. ,:"hlie only $,1.5.bIlhon 
went to the 20 largest public research laboratones. T~e NatIOnal AeronautICs and 
Space Administration's (NASA) proposed space statH?':l was recently ~ontrac~ed 
ut to private firms, as was health care for the U.S. military personnel.-o ForeIgn 
o oticy, too, was "privatized" by the Reagan administration when it circumvented 
ihe Congress by enlisting private "entrepreneurs:' to .sell.ar~s purc~ased from the 
Pentagon to Iran. Some of the "profits" from thiS pnvatlz~tlOn project were used 
to finance the Nicaraguan contras. This is, of course, the mfamous case of "Iran-
gate." . .. 
The election of President George Bush, a conservative Repubhcan hke Ronald 
Reagan, assures a.continuation of the U.S. privatizati~n program for at least the 
next four years. Fiscal year 1988 has on the CongresslOn~1 approved agen~a the 
sale of Amtrack, the Naval Petroleum Reserve. and other mlscellan~ou:, p~bhc real 
estate. The President's Commission on Privatization Report, published m March 
1988, outlines the future agenda for the U.S: privatization program .. 2i Virtually 
every remaining public asset of any value l~ ~Iated for sale to pnvate share-
holders-at a discount. Included are all remammg federal loans, the postal ser-
vices the federal Home Mortgage Association, federal prisons, and military 
comdtissaries. While the report champions privatization on the grounds that it 
promotes competition and offers consum.ers greate.r ~hoice. in no instance .does it 
recommend that the government engage m any activity currently monopolIzed by 
the private sector. The clear implication here is th~t the private. sector is p~~ se 
competitive and efficient. Neither history, economic theory, logIC, nor empmcal 
evidence support this assertion.22 
As large and as widespread as the U.S. and British denationalization programs 
are they both pale financially in comparison to Japan's privatization of one single 
co~pany. Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTH" The first block 
of shares sold in 1986 for $8,815 a share and provided the government WIth $17 
billion of revenue. Because it is Japanese government policy to maintain the price 
of NTT shares, which constitute 10 percent of the total value of stocks listed on 
the market, this one act of privatization, in dIect, provided a floor to the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange. On "Black Monday"· of 19 October 1987. Nippon T&T shares fell 
less than 10 percent, only to rebound to previous levels the very next day due to 
intervention in the market by the finance minister, who exerted pressure upon the 
major Japanese brokerage firms "to buy." The government ~ad a. big stake i.n 
maintaining the price of NTT stock, since it intends to denatIOnalize Japan Air 
Lines, Japan Tobacco Company, and the Japan National Railways in the near 
future. The total value of these and other Japanese public assets scheduled to be 
privatized exceeds $1 trillion. . 
Japan goes further than other industrial nations with its program, bec:au~e It .has 
a long history of government-planned, -financed, and -controlled pnvatlzatlon. 
During the Meiji Revolution of the late nineteenth century, nUl!'ero~s state-de-
veloped industrial enterprises and model factories were sold to pnvate mv~st?rs.24 
In fact, the latest global wave of privatization is, in essence: more dlstmc~ly 
Japanese than British or American. The impression gathered IS that the entire 
privatization "craze" is but a thinly veiled attempt on the part o~ ot~er ce.nter 
nations to duplicate Japan's fabulous economic success by copymg Its UnIque 
public/private sector institutional arrangem~nt. 
SUMMING UP 
One suspects that privatization in the center nations is, in many ways, a substitute 
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for the failed economic policies of monetarist and supply·side economics. The 
moneta~st policy of high interest rates in 1979 succeeded in reducing inflation but 
at the high cost of deindustriaiization, global depression. and Third World debt. 
This monetary policy was shortly followed by supply-side tax cuts, which did not 
generate the expected government revenues, but rather larger budget deficits 
everywhere they were implemented. Privatization was the perceived solution to all 
these ~roblems. Government revenue generated from the sale of public assets, tax 
reductIOns, and unprecedented deficit financing permitted the center nations to 
pursue expansionary quasi-Keynesian fiscal policies. The sale of public assets at 
discounted prices provided compensation for the deindustrialization losses and 
new investment oppportunities for center countries. 
It is perhaps too early to judge the overall success or failure of privatization in 
the center. In general, the private sector was expanded, profit rates were increased, 
and budget .deficits have been partially financed through the sale of public assets. 
But what will happen when the "family silver" has been sold and the limits of debt 
are reached? The costs of these programs have not yet been properly accounted for 
~r even reco~nized. in th~ develope~ center nations. Here, as elsewhere, privatiza-
t~on cam.e with a high pnce tag. Demdustrialization, unemployment, the distribu-
tI~n ~f lI~co~e, publi~ debt, and monopolization have all been worsened by 
prIvatizatIOn In the Untted States as well as in Great Britain. 
Neve~hele~s, most of the benefits of privatization, now as in the past, have 
been realIzed In the center nations of the world, while the peripheral countries 
have been made to shoulder a disproportionate share of the costs. Nowhere is this 
more evident than in Latin America. 
PRIVATIZATION IN THE LATIN AMERICAN PERIPHERY 
BRIEF HISTORY 
To fully comprehend contemporary privatization in Latin America, once again we 
must look first to economic history. From the time of the Spanish Conquest to the 
present, the. n.a~ions of this region have been part of the global periphery whose 
structural divIsIOn of tasks is to provide the center nations with minerals raw 
materials, and food in return for manufactured goods. Loans direct invest~ent 
and technical assistance from the center nations to the periphe;y cement these reai 
structural relationships. Mines in the Andean region, and plantations in the Cen-
tral American republics, as well as ranches and wheat farms in Argentina, were all 
develope~ t~ supply these primary commodities. Because transportation and 
com~erclal Infrastructure were necessary for the export of these primary com-
modities, they, ~oo, were developed. From these structural relationships developed 
a harmony of Interests between the commercial and financial interests of the 
cen~er nati.ons and those of the peripheral nations of Latin America. For a period 
of time, this arrangement brought limited prosperity to a number of Latin Amer-
ican countries; in the 1920s, for example, Argentina was one of the ten wealthiest 
nations in the world, with a per capita income greater than that of Japan. 
~owever, all this changed with the onset of the Great Depression of the 1930s, 
which greatly reduced the demand for and prices of Latin America's primary 
ex~orts and gave rise.to populistic governments in Argentina (Juan Peron), in the 
U ntted States (FranklIn D. Roosevelt), and elsewhere. These events-together with 
World ':Var II-greatly .weak~ned th~ structural ties between the center and periph-
ery. natIOns. P.reocc~pled with wagmg war, the center was unable to provide the 
pen~heral nations With manufactured goods or finance for development, while the 
war Increased both demand and prices for Third World primary commodity ex-
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ports, With record foreign exchange earnings. a number of Latin American Coun-
tries began to finance their own development and produce manufactured goods.~5 
After the war, most nations of the region tried to consolidate this new indepen-
dence, directing national and foreign investment to the manufacture of products 
previously imported in a strategy known as import substitution. For a period of 
time immediately after World War II, this strategy \vas successful, largely because 
the nations of the center were again preoccupied, this time with European recon-
struction, with conversion to peacetime production, and with huilding a united 
front against communism. Consequently, they had no immediate need or desire to 
re-establish the prewar structural relationships with the periphery. 
However, none of the Latin American countries developed into industrialized, 
economically independent powers during this period, primarily due to their over-
reliance on foreign, transnational corporations, which used inappropriate (capital· 
intensive) technology, produced unneces~ary (luxury) con...,umer goous, and en-
gaged in monopoly pricing and other ineffi~ient p~actices. The result was uneven 
and limited growth, lIlcreased dependency, lIlequahty, unemployment. and poverty 
throughout Latin America. ~6 
By the late 1960s, the economies of the industrialized countries had altered in a 
manner that obliged these countries to reconstruct the global structural rela-
tionships that had existed prior to World War II. Increased international competi-
tion, huge military expenditures for the "cold war," enhanced monopolization. and 
the Vietnam war all contributed to "stagflation" (stagnation plus inflation). Infla-
tion caused the terms of trade to move unfavorahly against the competitive pri-
mary-commodity producers of the Third World. The oil-exporting nations of the 
Middle East and Venezuela reacted to this turn of evenh by forming an interna-
tional cartel, the Organizaton of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The 
dramatic doubling of crude oil prices in 1973. and again in 1975. was the shock 
needed for the monumental global transformation required to 'wive stagflation in 
the economies of the center. It precipitated the 1973-1975 recession. worsened 
stagflation, and supplied the private multinational banks with an embarrassing 
abundance of petrodollars. Once the initial shock \vore otT and the industrial 
economies recovered from the recession, these hanks launched a glohal search for 
profitable investment opportunities. Hundreds of billions of petrodollars were 
recycled to Latin America in a very short period of time. Nearly all these private 
bank loans were guaranteed by the peripheral governmenh, were short-term (less 
than one year to maturity). and carried low rates of interest. 
Many of these loans were u.,ed by the Latin American countrie..., to finance their 
chronic balance-of-payment:', deficits, wor:-.ened hy the higher prices of imported 
oil and manufactured goods. Foreign exchange needed to pay for these imports and 
to service their foreign debts wa'i partially generated in the peripheral debtor 
nations through the increased export'i of primary products. Today, the develop-
ment model in Latin America is one of export promotion. Today, the major export 
of Mexico is crude oil. \vhile coffee and ...,oybean'i are the major exports of 
"industrialized" Brazil. In the 19ROs, every Latin American republic \vas returned 
to an increased dependent and peripheral status within the global capitalist com-
munity as a producer of primary products for export. 
OPEC's solution for the economic prohlem:-. of its members unfortunately 
worsened those of other Third World nations. "Petrodollar" ,-;urpluses, deposited 
in private multinational banks, were subsequently u..,ed to finance the international 
account deficits of the Latin American dehtor nations. Despite a worsening real 
economic situation in the non~oil-producing countrie'i of the Latin American 
periphery, low interest rates and abundant fllreign Illan:-. temporarily precluded a 
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crisis. Argentina's foreign debt increased to just $8 billion by 1979. Mexico's $29 
billion of debt was also manageable in 1979 and was the result of large investments 
in crude oil production. Only Brazil's foreign debt of more than $36 billion. due 
largely to inflated oil imports, was approaching crisis magnitude at this time.27 
For the region as a whole, the real economic crisis became a debt (financial) 
crisis only after the United States drastically restricted the supply of dollars in late 
1979, raised the rate of interest, and precipitated the world-wide depression of 
1981-1982. "Real interest rates~those adjusted for inflation-had averaged only 
0.85 percent from 1973 to 1980, rocketed to 10.68 percent in 1981 and averaged 
16.1 percent in the first half r 1982J. "2X The impact of this large increase in the real 
interest rates upon the foreign debts and economies of Argentina, Mexico. Brazil. 
and other debtor nations of the periphery was immediate and disastrous. Looking 
first at finances. we see that approximately half of the foreign debt of Latin 
America was private-bank, short-term credit. Each year the maturing portion of 
this debt had to be refinanced at the market rate of interest. Even if these countries 
had been able to pay the interest charges and had not borrowed any additional 
funds from abroad, their foreign debts would have doubled in about five or seven 
years at the prevailing high interest rates. In fact. the foreign debts of most Latin 
American debtor nations tripled and quadrupled in less than three years because 
they were obliged to borrow from abroad, not only to pay the interest and principal 
on their foreign debts. but also to pay for needed imports.29 
As debt interest and principal payments skyrocketed, the base upon which the 
debts depended for servicing and refinancing simultaneously eroded. The 1981-82 
recession lowered the demand and reduced the prices for primary commodity 
exports. and these prices have yet to recover.30 Servicing of foreign debts required 
more than 100 percent of foreign exchange earnings of the major Latin American 
nations by late 1982.31 In reaction, private capital began fleeing the region as never 
before-fleeing the inevitable devaluations. inflation, and exchange controls in 
their nations on the one hand, and attracted to the safe, high-interest return on 
investments in the center nations on the other hand. During the years from 1976 to 
1982, Argentina lost $27 billion, Mexico lost $36 billion. and the region as a whole 
(excluding Brazil) lost $93 billion in capital flight. 32 Had this financial capital not 
fled Latin America, or had the interest earned on this capital been repatriated, 
many of these countries would be practically debt-free today. 
Forced to rely on additional foreign loans to service their debts, balance their 
national accounts, and purchase needed imports, the debtor nations of Latin 
America became increasingly dependent on the financial community of the indus-
trialized nations, Aid from this source was immediately forthcoming, but at a very 
high price, Through the IMF as intermediary, private banks and governments of 
the center imposed austere monetary and fiscal policies upon the debtor nations as 
conditions for additional loans and debt rescheduling. Specific IMF Standby 
Agreements and loans varied from country to country, but they always included 
the following privatization conditions: (I) eliminate controls on finance and private 
enterprise; (2) reduce the role and size of the public sector in the economy; (3) 
adopt a wage-price policy that redistributes income from laborers to property 
owners; and (4) devaluate the currency and remove foreign exchange restrictions, 
Although Latin American governments had signed many of these agreements 
with the IMF in the past, they often resisted these conditions. which are widely 
perceived to be an intrusion into their national sovereignty. However, the more 
profound the crisis. the less these countries are able to moderate the demands of 
the IME The present crisis in Latin America is of such magnitude that each 
country's bargaining power is today virtually nil. After a brief period of resistance 
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and posturing, oppositio~ ,collapses. and the countrie~ are obliged to concede to 
IMF pressures and conditIOns, . , 
This creditor-debtor relationship can be seen as the monet~ry dlme,nslon and 
uence of the basic center-periphery structure, The OPEC reactIOn to the conseq . h' . I I' 
worsening terms of trade t.hrea~ened the center s Isltohl'lC ~o e as moOnopPEoC~ pfl~e-
ter and accumulator 01 capital. The response 0 t e cente~ to s pnce 
sett· was to reestablish the status qllo ante by first lending large ')ums of set 109 . . . I .. ·· h· I' 
t dollars to the peflpheral debtor natIOns and then <tbrupt y rdlslOg t e rdte 0 pero .. h . h d interest. The r,esulting d~bt, capital flight, and dehPlr,c')h".J0hn In
h
, t, e p:r,lp ery ~rleatle 
a crisis situation, aliowlOg the c,enter to re-esta IS ,t ~ 1,Istldm,c st~udcturd rei a-
tionship between it and the p~nphery; OPEC was dlsclp me 10 01 er to so ve 
stagflation in the center, cou~t,n~s,. " , . c ' •• 
The present economiC cnsls 10 L,a~1O An:en~<~ IS :eal 10 essence and In o,ngl? 
What appears to be a short-run cnsls of liqUIdity I,n, t~e money market,S IS, m 
reality, a manifestation of the str.":tural: I.ong-run CflSIS m global productIon and 
distribution. The world debt CflSIS offictall~ bega~ on 20 August 1982, when 
Mexico suspended principal pa~ments on It~ foreign debt. However: ,the. real 
economic crisis began much earh,er ~nd gave nse to ,the prescnt deb~ c.r~sls rather 
than the other way around, The slgn~fi.cance of all thIS for our purposes,ls t.hat ,the 
present crisis is th~ necessary conditIOn for the contempor~~~' wav,e ,of I?nvat!~~-
t ' in Latin Amenca, In the absence of the present economic dnd finanCial cnsl,s. \On . . . th L t it would not have been possible to impose pnvatlzatlOn programs upon e a m 
American republics. 
COMPULSORY PRIVATIZATION ..... .. 
Among the many ironies of conlempo~ary pnvatlz,a~lon In Latm Amen~a IS the 
current belief among orthodox economIsts and, dec~sl0n makers that Latin Amer-
. a's persistent underdevelopment and economIC cnses are thc result of too much 
IC . i' I public enterprise and ~overnment.-q, For the adherents ~t I e neoc ~tsslca p.ar~~ 
digm, private multinatIOnal corporatIons are not respon'ilble ~or ~atm Amenca s 
historic underdevelopment or structural dependency. Monetansm IS not, the cause 
of the debt crisis, nor are IMF austerity programs the perpetrat~rs ?I all o~ the 
above. Even Latin American adherents of thi~ paradigm are,becomlng Increasmgly 
uneasy with the widening gap between thi,s th:ory an,d reality, . 
Yet another irony of Latin American pnvatlzatlon 1:-' that the p~ogr,am~ are, often 
refered to as the "democratization of the economy," ~h~n ~n~a~lzatlon IS not 
imposed upon a nation's citizens by a dictator from Wlthl~, It ,IS Imposed from 
without by Western governments and the international orgaOlzatlOns they cont~ol; 
namely. the International Monetary Fund and the W~r1d B(~nk (lBRD)' Unlike 
Britain. France, and the United Slates. the debtor natIOns dId not, for th~ ~ost 
part, embrace privatization either voluntarily o~ with ideo~ogical conVIctIOn. 
Through such institutions as the U.S. Agency 10: In~ernatlOnal Development 
(USAID). privatization has been, and is presently' be mg. 1Inposed on the p,enph~ry 
as a condition for economic and financial assi:-.tance-as seen in the followmg 
directive from USAID/Washington to its field missions: 
Our goal will be for A.l.o. to be involved in an average of a,t least two 
privatization activities in each of these missions by the end of fiscal year 
1987, and two new privatization activitie~ every year thereaft~r. ' .. I~ other 
words. the selected bench mark" must represent substantial evo~utlOnary 
progress in moving the parastatal tmvards market-based ~pe~at1~ns a~d 
divestiture in order to qualify for A,I.D, a~sistance, ' Pnvatlzatlon will 
become an integral part of each mission's programming.3~ 
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The very Articles of Agreement of the World Bank moreover require such 
programs: 
t? promote pri~ate foreign investment by means of guarantees or participa-
tIOn loan~ and investments made by private investors. Only if these are not 
forthcoming on reasonable terms should the bank provide "finances for 
productive purposes out of its own capital. ")0 
Neither the World Bank nor AID operate independently of each other in 
peripheral nations. despite appearances and assertions to the contrary. It is now 
common knowledge that these agencies, along with private international banks. 
cooperate closely and coordinate their policies and programs. Presently, the sine 
ql~a non for e~~mo.mic and financial assistance from all these sources is compliance 
with the stablhz~t.lOn programs of the IMF, which, since the dollar standard (1971) 
and the debt cnsls (1982), has become both the "lender of last resort" and the 
architect-taskmaster of the austerity agreements. Today. nearly all the stabilization 
agreements include specific privatization provisions like those in Mexico's Third 
Letter of Intent to the International Monetary Fund: 
· .. the cancellation or freezing of all vacancies in the federal government 
and all paras tate companies. 
· .. As I?art of the process of nationalization of the nonstrategic activities of 
the.~ubhc ~ector, the government has initially set aside 236 companies and 
entIties which have state participation. which will be sold, merged, trans-
ferred to states or closed down. 
· .. the majority of shares of the non-banking companies has been sold. 
· .. This plan [FICORCAj continues to work successfully: presently the 
program covers approximately $12 billion dollars of private sector debt, of 
which $5 billion have been the object of definite restructuring . .17 
In this one agreement alone, the Mexican government committed itself to 
selling one-fourth of the nation's public entities. In short. the Latin American 
privatization programs are encouraged. if not imposed, by the center and con-
stit~t~ yet a~oth~r dimen~ion. of peripheral nation dependency. Therefore. two 
a~dltlOnal. ~bJectlves of pnvatlzatlOn programs in Latin America are (I) comply 
With conditIOnal loan agreements: and (2) attract back the hundreds of billions of 
dollars that have fled since the debt crisis. 
The hu~e stock of untaxed assets of wealthy Latin Americans deposited in the 
center. natIOns now equa!s at I.east half of the total foreign debts of the region. 
~ere IS, clearly, a cl~ss dlme~slOn to both the foreign debt crisis and the privatiza-
tlO~ progr~ms m Latm A.menca. Public debt and private profit is a reality of the 
regIOn: to Ignore or deny It serves only to render the issues incomprehensible. The 
profitability of debt and denationalization for sectors of international and national 
capital explains why privatization programs are imposed on these countries from 
abroad as well as why they are embraced by political and business leaders from 
within. 
. I~ Mexico, where the Third World debt crisis officially began in 1982, privatiza-
tIOn IS well advanced. It is .estimated that approximately half of the money Mexico 
borrowed from abroad dunng the I 970s and 1980s has since turned around and left 
t~e. countr~ in "capi.tal flight." In addition, half of Mexico's approximately $107 
bIllIon foreign debt IS owed to private multinational banks. Since 1983 Mexico 
paid $33 billion in interest to its foreign creditors, while receiving only $13 billion 
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. new foreign loans. Including capital flight. Mexico lent nearly $50 billion. net, to ~e outside world. Pa~adoxically, t.he nati~n's private assets ~eld ~br.oad are n,?w 
proximately equal m value to Its pubhc sector debt. whICh, mCldentally, In-a~ased by approximately $20 billion during this same period. 38 
C From the information above, a number of statements c~n be m~de that apply 
not only to Mexico, ~ut also to the ~ther debt-bu!de~ed La~m Amencan co~ntnes. 
While Mexico's forel~n debts (debits) ~re pubhc. Its forel~n assets (credits) .are 
rivate. The tax-free mcome of these pnvate assets abroad IS more than suffiCIent 
io service Mexico's public foreign debt. 'Yealt~~ Mexicans bene~t greatly from ~he 
existing debt arrangements, the economic cnSIS, and the IM.F-Imposed austentyi 
privatization measures. They profit from the many devaluations ?f the peso, the 
falling real wages, the debt crisis, and privat!zation-all of which are related. 
These capital flight assets, held abroad by MeXican speculators, ar~ leg.ally unen-
cumbereuby the nation's foreign debts for which the~.a:e responslb~e.m the first 
place. Ironically, m~ny o~ these Mexicans are the pohtlcta~s a~d ~eclslon makers 
who make economiC policy. Perhaps the most unusual pnvatlzatlon feature cur-
rently in vogue in Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America is the .~ebt-eq~ity swap. 
Although Mexico is obliged to pay interest on th: face. value of ItS foreign .Ioans, 
private foreign banks today s~1l these debts to pnvate m~~stors ~t half their fa~e 
value in dollars. The private Investors redeem the secuntles at full face value In 
pesos from the Mexican government and then proceed to purchase the real ass~ts 
of manufacturing plants, hotels, or land. In essence, therefore, real productIve 
property in Mexico is being discounted 50 percent via these debt-equity swaps for 
those who possess sufficient dollars. One fails to see the "equity" in these 
ingenious financial transactions. .. . 
Prime targets of these subsidized investments are the public enterpnses pn-
vatized by the Mexican government. Nacional Hotelera. Mexico\; profitable state-
owned hotel chain, was privatized in 1985 with the aid of a debt-equity swap. 
Aeromexico ceased operations in 1988 and is scheduled to be ':lold to private 
investors along with an additional 300 other Mexican public enterprises. Unlike 
Nacional Hotelera, however, many of these public enterprises are not profitable 
and will be difficult to privatize unless their assets are hierarchically discounted. 
Privatized public assets, doubly discounted in this manner, are profitable invest-
ments. 
Mexico's privatization program has attracted very little investment to the 
industries that produce for domestic consumption. due to the depressed condition 
ofthe Mexican economy. Real wages and income are low and have been decreasing 
since 1982. In order to attract flight capital and foreign investment back to the 
country, as well as to generate the billions of dollars needed to service its foreign 
debt, Mexico's new development strategy is oriented to export. Maqlliladoras-
multinational corporate assembly plants on the United States border-were de-
signed to achieve these objectives. Maqlliladoras are virtually tax-free, assemble 
imported component parts with imported machinery, and export the final products 
to the United States and other industrialized nations. Since 1982. the number of 
maquiladoras has doubled and today there are about 1,000 of these plants employ-
ing more than 300,000 Mexican workers at an official minimum wage of $3.50 a 
day. Maquiladoras account for more than one quarter of Mexico's ~o~al manu~ac­
turing and "non-traditional exports. "39 This combination of subSidized capital, 
cheap labor, and virtually no taxes or tariffs makes maquiladoras ~ery p.rofi~able 
investments, with the result that they attracted large numbers of multinatIOnal 
corporations, predominately from the United States and Japan. 
But does all this constitute a successful Mexican privatization program? Per-
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haps it is too early to tell. One thing is certain: privatization has not proven to be a 
panacea for Mexico's economic problems. The country's foreign debt continues to 
increase, national capital has not returned, stagflation continues. income distribu-
tion worsens. and the already low Mexican standard of living is further deteriorat-
ing.40 In response, millions of Mexicans have fled the country, many of them 
illegally. Others expressed their discontent with the ruling Institutional Revolution-
ary Party (PRI) in 1988, in which PRJ candidate Carlos Salinas de Gortari won 
with only 50 percent of the vote. PRJ's electoral share just one decade ago was 85 
percent, and for half a century it monopolized Mexican politics. President Salinas. 
a Harvard University graduate, was the nation's budget and planning minister 
during the previous administration and is widely believed to be the architect of 
Mexico's austerity/privatization programs. He calls it "modernization" or "re-
structuring," not "privatization" or "export promotion," and promises the nation 
more of the same. 
Since the Mexican experience with privatization is being duplicated throughout 
Latin America, modified only by nationalistic and geographic distinctions, we 
briefly consider the privatization program in just one other country: Brazil. Since 
World War II, Brazil's model of development was based upon the partnership of 
state-owned enterprises, Brazilian-owned private firms. and foreign-owned multi-
national corporations. Capital-intensive utilities-Petrobras (petroleum). Embratel 
(telephone), Nuclerbas (nuclear energy). and the Itaipil Dam-have traditionally 
been public. Private capital was unable or unwilling to invest in these long-term, 
high-risk ventures. 41 This tripartite mixed economy, like that of Mexico's, was 
oriented to national development via import substitution from the 1930s until 1960. 
The coup of 1964. led by General Humberto Castello Branco, ushered in an era of 
multinational corporate expansion and liberalization for the Brazilian economy. 
The so-called Brazilian Miracle (1968 to 1973) of double-digit growlh rates and 
balance-of-payments surpluses occasioned by foreign direct investments and 
World Bank loans, however, abruptly ended shortly after the OPEC oil price 
increases of 1973 and 1975. 
Brazilian privatization during this period was hampered by the nationalistic 
policies and goals of the military governments, which clashed with the "state-
shrinking" ideology of its neoconservative alliance. Much evidence points to an 
expansion of the public sector during this period of "authoritarian capitalism. "42 
This trend continued during the following years of petrodollar recycling via multi-
national banks. Brazil incurred huge foreign debts in the later half of the 1970s in 
order to pay for oil imports and undertake public mega-projects, like the Sao Paulo 
subway and the Itaipil Dam. Even the 1980-1981 recession inadvertently ex-
panded the Brazilian public sector when foreign capital flows reversed themselves 
and many private enterprises went bankrupt and were taken over by the state. 
Like Mexico's, Brazil's massive foreign debt to private multinational banks, 
capital flight, and IMF austerity agreements soon combined to set the stage for 
Brazil's contemporary privatization program. Brazil's foreign debt of nearly $120 
billion is today the largest in the peripheral world. To service this debt, Brazil has 
to export billions of dollars more than it imports. Brazil realized a trade surplus of 
$6 billion in 1983, $9 billion in 1984, and over $12 billion in 1985. It is estimated, 
however, that an additional $20 billion will be required to service Brazil's foreign 
debt in 1990. 
As was the case in Mexico, Brazil's privatization was an IMF condition for 
additional foreign loans. During the decade from 1975 to 1985, Brazil's experience 
with its debt paralleled that of Mexico and most other Latin American nations. It 
can be summarized as austerity, stagflation, privatization, liberalization, and ex-
A 106 
PRIVATIZATION IN THE CENTER AND THE I.ATlN AMERICA~ PERIPHERY 
port promotion: The ec~n.om~c policies were .t~e same: an? so. were the :esults. 
During this penod. BrazlllOstltuted a new po/ttlca de prn'(JIlzarllO; 88 public firms 
were slated for privatization by the Special Commission on ~estatization in 
1981.43 The textile firm Dona Izabel. the publishing firm Jose OIYPIQ, and the paper 
company Inbrapel were all secretly privatized: that is. sold to investors' bids 
without public knowledge. 
Like Mexico's also, the Brazilian IMF austerity/privatization programs re-
turned the nation to renewed dependency on foreign finance and commodity 
exportation. Today, "i~dustrialized" Brazil's two l~adin.g export::. are. soybeans ~nd 
coffee. Increased penpheral dependency, hypennftatlOn. economic depreSSIOn, 
and a worsening income distribution eventually led to massive political discontent 
and democracy in January 1985. 
Soon after taking office. the civilian government of President Jose Sarney 
refused to follow the IMF "game plan," and their agreement was broken. Early in 
1986, the government launched the heterodox Cruzado Plan in an attempt to 
control inflation by fixing wages and prices. One year later. the plan collapsed 
when the corporations raised prices to obtain traditionally inflated profits. The 
private multinational banks also resisted Brazilian bilateral negotiations of its 
foreign debt without IMF conditions. In response, Brazil declared a moratorium 
on private bank debt payments in February of 1987. Shortly thereafter, the World 
Bank and the U.S. Import-Export Bank denied the nation short-term trade credits. 
The trade surplus immediately deteriorated, capital fled the country, and inflation 
soon reached the four-digit level. Less than a year later. the Brazilian government 
capitulated and renewed payments on its debts to the private Foreign banks. Br~zil 
was subsequently rewarded with $6 billion in new bank credit and a reschedulmg 
(extension) of its debt obligations. 
Even without an IMF austerity agreement. however, Brazil promoted most IMF 
policies, including privatization. In June 1987. the government.'s Privatizati?n 
Council targeted 65 of the nation's remaining 179 operating industnal and finanCial 
firms for immediate privatization.44 
Today, the primary function of Brazil's National Bank for Economic Develop-
ment is to sell public enterprises. Attempts on the part of President Jose Sarney's 
government and the Brazilian constitutional committee to ~estrict the sale of 
public assets to Brazilian national firms and terminate debt-e.qulty s~aps hav~ bo~h 
failed.45 Privatization in Brazil, despite heterodox economic expenmentatJOn, IS 
alive and well. As was the case in Mexico, a huge foreign debt. historic foreign 
dependency, and an economic crisis are fertile ground for the promotion of 
privatization programs. The Brazilian experience shows that unilateral debt mor-
atoriums, price-fixing schemes, or any other nationalistic policies of eve.n d~mo­
cratically elected governments are apparently no match for the multmatlOnal 
corporations and the international financial community. Privatization is profitabl~: 
Where else can a billion dollars of real assets be purchased for a quarter of their 
market value?46 
Since Brazil's experiment with privatization, like that of Mexico, has not yet 
ended, the benefits and costs for a complete accounting are not yet available. 
Nevertheless, by now it is obvious that privatization programs in Brazil did not 
achieve their objectives. The nation's foreign debt continues to increase at a 
geometric rate, inflation is currently running at an astronomical 900 percent per 
annum, private capital investment has been. exclusively directed to export prod~c­
tion, and the nation's growth rate has turned negative. Above and beyond all thiS, 
Brazil's income distribution has worsened, poverty has increas·ed, and political 
discontent with President Sarney's government is approaching crisis levels. 47 Re-
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c~nt labor strikes and the election of a "populist" mayor in the industrial city of 
S~~ Paulo portend the future course of politics in Brazil-barring a return to 
military rule. 
CONCLUSION 
Far from being a panacea. privatization in the periphery is part of the problem. The 
pre~ent economic and financial debt crisis made it possible for industrialized 
~atIOns. throug? the IM,F, USAID, and bank intermediaries, to impose privatiza-
tIOn on the Latm Amencan republics. In Brazil, Mexico, and other debtor coun-
tries, pri~atization/austerity programs have restructured national economies to 
export-onented development, providing multinational corporations with new in-
ve.stmeot oppo~tunit~es and increased profits. The resulting depressed commodity 
prIces <:tnd .capital fll~ht helped solve stagflation in the center economies, while 
worsemng It In BraZIl, Mexico, and the rest of Latin America. As in the past 
therefore, .contemporary privatization benefited the center largely at the expens~ 
of the perIphery. 
Wha~ will happen to ~he government budgets, the foreign debts, and the 
economies of LatIn AmerIca after all public assets have been privatized? Soon, 
~er~ soon, per~aps, we shall have the answer. Most political analysts would be 
mchn.ed to adml~ that programs and policies of this type are candidates for disaster. 
As With everythIng else, there are limits to the public subsidy of private enterprise 
~s well as to the .fr~ntiers of capitalism. In Latin America today, there are indica-
tIons that these hmlts are rapidly being approached-if not already breached. The 
recent Venez~elan riots, the Peruvian debt moratorium, and the revolutions in 
Cent.ral Am~r~ca are perhaps only the tip of the iceberg. Privatization programs 
proVide SOCialIsts and nationalists in Latin America with a new ideological issue 
th~t n,tay be w?rth more to them in the long run than the market value of the 
pnvatIzed pubhc assets are to the multinational corporate investors in the short 
run. 
-Melvin Burke 
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